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most of the American participants (espe- their own during the crisis. That in itself Dobrynin s claim was not accurate, as the
cially those who had to depend on English would not be sufficient grounds to reject his ex-ambassador himself later acknowledged
translations) interpreted the general s re- purported disclosures, but at the very least with considerable embarrassment.5 This
marks in the same way that Schlesinger did. it should have induced skepticism and cau- false alarm should have spawned greater
Although a few of the Americans remained tion on the part of the American participants. caution on the part of those who may have
continued on page 42
decidedly skeptical about the thrust of Circumspection is in order whenever
COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 41
A T E
KRAMER VS. KRAMER: of fact, interpretation, and inference that we use of tactical nuclear weapons during the
Or, How Can You Have Revisionism in the Absence
feel compelled to address his argument in Cuban missile crisis without approval from
of Orthodoxy?
detail. A closer look reveals that his analysis Moscow. Kramer asserts that Lt. Col.
is not merely flawed; it is self-refuting so Anatoly Dokuchaev, author of the article in
by James G. Blight, Bruce J. Allyn, and
obviously so that we find it difficult to un- which Garbuz and Beloborodov give their
David A. Welch
derstand why this was not apparent to Kramer testimony, is absolutely right when he
himself. We can only imagine that his attack concludes that Moscow jealously guarded
Almost everything in this statement is inaccurate
Mark Kramer has some deeper motivation and meaning its prerogative to decide whether to autho-
that led him astray. Hence the sadness of rize nuclear action in Cuba. Kramer be-
Gadflies and devil s advocates perform which we speak. lieves Gribkov s later testimony constitutes
a valuable academic service. They prevent We preface our remarks by noting that a retraction which bring[s] Gribkov s
hasty analysis, inadequate circumspection, we are not responsible, nor will we apolo- position into line with my own.
and premature closure. We would like to gize, for the sensationalism of the press. This is most curious. Kramer evidently
take this opportunity to thank our colleague Contrary to Kramer s imputation, we have believes the question has been settled defini-
Mark Kramer for shouldering the gadfly s not encouraged this. In fact, throughout our tively. But to date, we have seen no docu-
work on the Cuban missile crisis we have mentation that would justify this conclu-
ns and the Cuban Missile Crisis:
constantly struggled against it. That said, sion. Russian military officials have pro-
change
Gen. Anatoly Gribkov s claims at the Ha- vided us with what they claim to be verbatim
vana conference were unprecedented and quotations from, and specific citations to,
olving American , Cuban, and Russian veterans and
certainly newsworthy, and we would have documents from the General Staff archives
et General Anatoli I. Gribkov startled many in his
been remiss in our outreach responsibilities that support Gribkov s original story: namely,
ho three decades earlier had been responsible for
had we not reported them and commented that Khrushchev pre-delegated to Pliyev the
o Cuba, stated that Soviet forces on the island during
on their possible significance. Neither are authority to launch tactical nuclear missiles.
s well as predelegated authority from Soviet leader
we responsible for George Ball s minor mis- They have also provided us with what they
rican invasion force, even if communications with
understandings of Gribkov s claims and of claim are paraphrases of documents (but no
The Havana Conference On the Cuban Missile Crisis,
Soviet command-and-control arrangements, verbatim quotations or specific citations)
ments, with their seeming implication that the crisis
nor for the judgments of colleagues, such as suggesting that at some point and certainly
y thought, aroused intense public interest as well as
Philip Brenner and Thomas Weiss, who con- within a few hours of President Kennedy s
iability of Gribkov s assertions. Taking issue with
cluded on the basis of their participation in October 22 speech announcing the U.S. dis-
a Conference, and questioning the evidentiary basis
ated with the Center for Foreign Policy Development the Havana meeting that the crisis was even covery of the missiles and his intention to
ter at Harvard University. Responding to Kramer s more dangerous than they had thought. While impose a quarantine Khrushchev instructed
avid A. Welch, who collectively were involved in
we heartily concur with their assessment, we Pliyev not to use nuclear weapons of any
sewhere devoted to studying the missile crisis, and
speak here only for ourselves. kind except on Moscow s explicit instruc-
he Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis, and the Soviet
tion. But we have not as yet seen originals or
on Books. Via an American intermediary, General
Soviet Standing Orders For facsimiles of any of these documents, and
d to Mark Kramer s article on his statements relating
Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Cuba the excerpts and summaries that we have
issile Crisis. However, Gribkov declined, saying he
seen leave unresolved such crucial issues as
ing book: Gens. Anatoli I. Gribkov and William Y.
Some months after the Havana confer- the manner in which Khrushchev conveyed
erals Recount the Cuban Missile Crisis (Chicago:
ence, in interviews with us and in a revised to Pliyev his original standing orders; the
version of his memoir of the crisis,1 Gribkov date on which he received them; the number
burden for the past five years as our detailed claimed that on 22 October 1960, Khrush- and precise content of any changes made to
investigation of the Cuban missile crisis has chev, through Minister of Defense Rodion them subsequently; and the timing of the
evolved. His skepticism at every step of the Ya. Malinovsky, categorically forbade Pliyev alleged modifications. In short, we have yet
way has been a useful reminder to us that to use nuclear weapons of any kind under to see any hard evidence one way or an-
deeply-rooted beliefs die hard. any circumstances in Cuba. Kramer be- other. The evidence that we have seen (soft
Nevertheless, it is with some sadness lieves that this admission by Gribkov though it may be) tends to support Gribkov s
that we pen these words, because there would along with corroborating testimony by two original story somewhat more strongly than
have been no need for us to reply if Kramer other Soviet officers familiar with command- the revised accounts. Thus, although Kramer
had confined himself to presenting the en- and-control arrangements during the crisis decries the utter lack of evidence for
tirely plausible argument that Gen. Issa (Gen. Leonid S. Garbuz, Pliyev s deputy in Gribkov s original claims, he is apparently
Pliyev, commander of Soviet forces in Cuba 1962, and Lt. Gen. [then Col.] Nikolai willing to accept unreservedly a modified
in 1962, may not have had the authority Beloborodov, allegedly the commander of set of claims supported by even less.
during the Cuban missile crisis to decide the central nuclear base in Cuba)2 How might Kramer justify his confi-
whether to use nuclear weapons in the event should set the record straight once and for dence? Certainly not by any appeal to au-
of a U.S. invasion. But Kramer has chosen all. This new evidence, Kramer claims, thority. One of the men providing the crucial
to attack us personally, and in the course of should ... put to rest any further claims that testimony upon which Kramer
continued on page 47
so doing, he has committed so many errors General Pliev was authorized to order the
42 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN
D E B A T E
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